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Abstract 
Lie detection research has shown that observers who rely on nonverbal cues or on 
verbal cues correctly classify on average 54% of truth tellers and liars. In addition, over the 
years, countless numbers of innocent people have made false confessions and, in analysing 
the problem, researchers have implicated both a suspect’s vulnerability and the persuasive 
influence of certain police interrogation tactics. Levine et al. (2014) aim to contribute to these 
vast bodies of literature by reporting two studies purportedly showing that expert interviewers 
- when they are permitted to question interviewees - can achieve almost perfect accuracy 
without eliciting false confessions. We argue that theoretical and methodological aspects of 
these studies undermine the reliability and validity of the data reported, that as a result the 
studies do not contribute to the scientific literatures on lie detection and false confessions in 
any meaningful way, and that the results are dangerously misleading. 
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Problems in expert deception detection and the risk of false confessions: 
No proof to the contrary in Levine et al. (2014) 
 More than half a century of lie detection research has shown that observers who rely 
on nonverbal cues or on verbal cues without using established verbal lie detection procedures 
such as Criteria-Based Content Analysis (Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij, 2005), or Reality 
Monitoring (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Sporer, 2004), correctly classify on 
average 54% of truth tellers and liars (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This percentage is low given 
that 50% of truth tellers and liars would be correctly classified by just flipping a coin. 
Practitioners who see themselves as experts in lie detection and lay persons achieve similar 
accuracy rates (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Vrij, 2008). Research 
suggests a possible explanation for the empirical failures of lie-detection training: By 
focusing on non-diagnostic behavioral cues, the Reid Technique (Inbau, Reid, Buckley & 
Jayne, 2013) merely formalizes the folk wisdom that laypeople already use without much 
success (Masip, Barba, & Herrero, 2012; Masip, Herrero, Garrido, & Barba, 2011). In fact, 
the primary differences between experts and lay persons is that experts profess greater 
confidence in their ability to detect deceit and they tend to demonstrate a bias towards 
perceiving deception (Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, 
2008).  
Those who train practitioners for a living have argued that basic research is limited in 
external validity because laboratory experiments typically involve college students randomly 
assigned to lie or tell the truth in non-consequential, low stakes situations (Buckley, 2012; 
Frank & Svetieva, 2012; O’Sullivan, Frank, Hurley, & Tiwana, 2009). Yet in a recent meta-
analysis of 144 samples containing 9,380 speakers, providing a total of 26,866 messages, and 
spanning more than forty years, Hartwig and Bond (2014) found that the detectability of 
deception did not differ as a function of whether the speaker was a college student or non-
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student; whether the motivation to evade detection was high or low; or whether the truths and 
lies were accompanied by high or low levels of emotion. Indeed, recent research has shown 
that the ability to discriminate between truth tellers and liars can be improved only when 
certain theoretically based interview protocols are used (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Hartwig, 
Granhag, & Luke, 2014; Vrij, 2015) and when training focuses on the most diagnostic cues 
(Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, in press).  
Over the years, countless numbers of innocent people have been wrongfully convicted 
after confessing to crimes they did not commit. This phenomenon has occurred throughout 
history, though the extent of the problem was unclear (e.g., Munsterberg, 1908; Miranda v. 
Arizona, 1966; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985). Then in 1992 the Innocence Project was 
founded for the purpose of using new DNA technology to test biological evidence in disputed 
conviction cases involving rapes and murders. It is now clear that more than 25% of these 
DNA exonerations have involved as a contributing factor the false confession of an innocent 
person (www.innocenceproject.org/; Garrett, 2011). It is important to note that this sample of 
DNA exonerations represents only a fraction of all wrongful convictions—those cases in 
which the consequences were most severe (for a more comprehensive data base, see National 
Registry of Exonerations; www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx). 
Indeed, contrary to the commonsense belief that people do not confess to crimes they did not 
commit, large numbers of such cases have been exposed—not only in the United States, but 
all over the world. In analysing the problem, researchers have implicated both individual 
difference characteristics that increase a suspect’s vulnerability (such as youth, intellectual 
disability, and mental illness) and the persuasive influence of certain police interrogation 
tactics (such as accusatorial methods that include the use of guilt-presumptive questions, the 
presentation of false evidence, and minimization tactics that imply leniency; for reviews, see 
Gudjonsson, 2003; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; Lassiter & Meissner, 2010; Meissner, 
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Redlich, Michael, Evans, Camilletti, Bhatt, & Brandon, 2014; Warden & Drizin, 2009; for an 
official White Paper, see Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010). 
 Levine et al. (2014) aim to contribute to this vast body of lie detection and false 
confessions literature by reporting two studies purportedly showing that expert interviewers – 
when they are permitted to question interviewees – can achieve almost perfect accuracy 
without ever eliciting a false confession. Specifically, using a variation of the Exline, Thibaut, 
Hickey, and Gumpert (1970) and Russano, Meissner, Narchet and Kassin’s (2005) cheating 
paradigms, Levine and colleagues permitted participants an opportunity to cheat on a trivia 
game in which they competed for a cash prize.  Those who cheated were considered guilty, 
those who did not were considered innocent. Experienced interrogators then questioned the 
subjects in an effort to determine guilt or innocence through the elicitation of a confession or 
admission.  In Study 1, the interrogator was J. Pete Blair, an author on the published study 
who was aware of the study hypotheses. In Study 2, the interrogators were “five federal 
agents with substantial polygraph and interrogation experience.” In Study 1, the single expert 
obtained a 100% accuracy rate in distinguishing truth tellers (non-cheaters) from liars (those 
who cheated). In Study 2, five different experts obtained an averaged 97.7% accuracy rate. 
Furthermore, the experts in these studies did not elicit a single false confession. These are 
unquestionably the best interviewing data ever published in a peer-reviewed journal. An 
article that reports such high accuracy rates will attract much attention, not only from 
researchers, but also from the media and practitioners. 
 In this article, we argue that both theoretical and methodological aspects of these two 
studies seriously undermine the reliability and validity of the data reported, and that as a 
result the studies do not contribute to the scientific literatures on lie detection and false 
confessions in any meaningful way.  In fact, the results are dangerously misleading.  
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Truth telling is easy and lying is difficult in the Levine et al. paradigm 
Levine et al. (2014) report that only ecologically valid studies reveal the true ability of 
experts to detect deception. While we have raised the same point (Vrij & Granhag, 2012), 
ecological validity should not be restricted to the task of the interrogator – it should also 
apply to the task of the truth tellers and liars in the deception study. Levine et al. neglect this 
second aspect of ecological validity and it is this aspect of their study that we find highly 
problematic. Participants in Levine et al. played a trivia game with a partner (a confederate) 
and received money ($5 in Study 1; $10 in Study 2) for each correct answer. The 
experimenter was called out of the room after the third of ten questions, at which point the 
confederate suggested cheating – and hence stealing money – during the experimenter’s 
absence. Very few participants in Study 1 (4 out of 33) but more participants in Study 2 (40 
out of 89) actually cheated, and hence were “guilty”.  All participants were then questioned 
by an expert interviewer. In Study 1, participants were asked which questions they got right 
and how they knew these correct answers. The participant was then asked whether s/he 
cheated and was informed that the partner would be interviewed next. The interviewer then 
left the room “to check some things” and accused the participant of cheating upon his return.  
All four cheaters confessed. In Study 2, the interviews were unscripted and no information 
about the interview style is given. A total of 34 out of 40 cheaters confessed. No false 
confessions occurred in either study. The authors do not provide examples of the questions 
used in the trivia game except to say that they were difficult and that giving a correct answer 
was highly diagnostic (i.e., cheaters give correct answers, non-cheaters do not). The decision 
rule that more than one correct answer indicates cheating yielded an accuracy level of 
approximately 80%.  
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 Let’s go over this study again. Participants can win a cash prize when answering 
questions correctly. However, the questions are so difficult that most participants cannot give 
more than one correct answer. Those who gave a correct answer were asked how they came 
to know that answer. Those who really knew the correct answer could easily explain; those 
who cheated could not. Liars were thus set up in this experiment and had to lie about a topic 
for which they had no knowledge. Of course, such liars can be easily distinguished from truth 
tellers and for the investigator the lie detection task is strikingly easy: judge anyone who 
gives no correct answer as a truth teller (because why would a cheater who knew a correct 
answer not disclose it?) and ask those who did give one or more correct answers how they 
came to know these answers. If the participant can give a convincing answer, then they are a 
truth teller. If they cannot give a convincing answer, ask further questions in a situation that 
becomes very awkward for liars who will struggle to manufacture a convincing explanation. 
Clearly, the liars themselves realised the awkwardness of their situation; hence, the vast 
majority of them gave up and confessed. Their confessions made the investigator’s lie 
detection task even easier than it already was.  
The experimental design used by Levine et al. does not begin to resemble truth and lie 
detection in real life situations. The difficulty that investigators face in real life is that truth 
tellers can give poor and unconvincing performances, which can be easily exaggerated with 
an intimidating interview style resulting in false accusations of lying or false confessions 
(Kassin et al., 2010). This risk is not present in this scenario, as a single question easily 
discriminated between cheaters and non-cheaters. Most truth tellers did not know any correct 
answers or only one correct answer. Since no interrogator would think that participants who 
did not give a correct answer would be lying, false accusations will not occur in that group 
and there is no inclination to increase the pressure on such truth tellers. Truth tellers who 
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gave a correct answer could explain where that knowledge came from. Thus, they could 
easily convince the interviewer that they were telling the truth, resulting in no false 
accusations and no inclination to intimidate them.  
Another difficulty investigators face in real life is that liars can give good and 
convincing performances. They prepare themselves for their interviews (Granhag & Hartwig, 
2008) and often embed their lies in mostly truthful accounts (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013; 
Vrij, 2008). Liars are seldom unprepared for an interview, as they were in this study, nor 
would they choose to lie about something about which they have no knowledge. In fact, the 
liars in this study found themselves in such a futile situation that 38 out of 44 who cheated in 
the two studies simply gave up and confessed. In other words, the ecological validity from 
the perspective of truth tellers and liars in the two studies was poor and this resulted in 
inflated accuracy rates.  
The task for observers who were shown the videotaped interviews was also easy. If a 
simple confession-based decision rule was used—i.e., “all non-confessors are non-cheaters 
and all confessors are cheaters”—this heuristic would have resulted in a correct classification 
of all truth tellers (non-cheaters) and liars (cheaters) in Study 1, the same 100% accuracy rate 
that the singular expert in Study 1 had obtained. In Study 2, all 49 truth tellers and 34 out of 
40 liars would have been classified correctly, yielding a 93.2% accuracy rate, similar to the 
97.7% accuracy rate obtained by the experts in Study 2. Using a confession-based decision 
rule means that Levine et al.’s article is not about deception detection at all, as they concede 
themselves, but rather about how individuals use confessions to determine the guilt or 
innocence of interviewees. This latter finding is quite in line with the findings of Narchet, 
Meissner, and Russano (2011) who demonstrated that interviewers’ judgments of guilt-
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innocence in the cheating paradigm are largely based upon whether a confession has been 
elicited. 
The studies say nothing about expertise in interviewing 
 The interviews in Study 2 were not scripted. We understand that unscripted interviews 
are necessary to examine whether experts can accurately distinguish between truths and lies 
in interviews. However, no analysis or description of the interview protocol or methods used 
by the experts was disclosed, which makes it impossible to determine what factors made the 
interviewers so apparently effective. The failure to include a control group of non-expert 
interviewers in these studies also means that no conclusion can be derived about the role of 
expertise. Given that truth telling was very easy and lying was very difficult, the combination 
of which creates highly favourable conditions for accurate truth and lie detection, we cannot 
rule out that non-experts interviewers would perform equally well in this paradigm – and 
therein that the interview style or expertise of the interviewer was irrelevant.  
The false confessions problem has been misrepresented by Levine et al. 
Despite the numerous false confessions discovered in wrongful conviction cases, 
often involving rape and murder (Garrett, 2011; www.innocenceproject.org/); and in contrast 
to the false confessions routinely obtained in laboratory experiments that used the computer 
crash paradigm (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996) even when the confession was said to bear a 
financial or other consequence (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, & Josephs, 2003; Redlich & 
Goodman, 2003), the cheating paradigm (Russano et al. 2005) and adaptations of it (Perillo & 
Kassin, 2001), and other paradigms involving stolen money (e.g., Nash & Wade, 2009), 
Levine et al. report the “provocative finding” (p. 457) that not a single false confession was 
elicited in their studies – ever. 
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Why might this be the case? The answer is simple: False confessors capitulate for a 
reason – because they are badgered over lengthy periods of time; want to escape a situation 
that is bad and getting worse; feel distressed, confused, and helpless to prove their innocence; 
or mistakenly believe that confession is in their self-interest. This is precisely what happened 
in 1955 when a false confession to murder was extracted from Darrel Parker by John Reid, 
architect of the Reid technique and founder of John Reid & Associates (Starr, 2013). Yet 
clearly, the innocent participants in Levine et al. had no reason to confess. They did not cheat, 
and they could prove it! They could prove it because they could explain how they came to 
know the answers to the questions they answered correctly or by admitting that they did not 
know a single correct answer. In addition, in Study 1, the experimenter who administered the 
trivia game knew how many questions each participant had answered correctly, the 
partner/confederate knew whether the participant had cheated, and the interviewee had every 
reason to think that both individuals were available for the investigator to confirm innocence 
when he walked out of the interview room to “check on some things”. 
Simply put, the innocent participants in this study – compared to those in other 
studies, and certainly compared to those who were wrongfully convicted in real life – were 
given no reason or motivation to confess to a transgression they did not commit. We would 
argue that the ‘How did you come to know the answer’ question was so diagnostic that 
investigators  never had to apply the kinds of coercive questioning strategies that would yield 
a false confession. Hence, it is not surprising that other studies as well involving the cheating 
paradigm conducted by Levine and colleagues have similarly failed to ever obtain a false 
confession (Levine, Blair, & Clare, 2013; Levine, Kim, & Blair, 2010; Levine, Shulman, 
Carpenter, DeAndrea, & Blair, 2013).  
Instead of pointing out that truth tellers could easily prove their innocence, Levine et 
al. (2014) describe several possible moderators that distinguish their studies and findings 
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from the original cheating paradigm study conducted by Russano et al. (2005). First, they 
suggest that there are differences in the seriousness of the offense, suggesting that the 
Russano et al. study frames cheating as an act of “helping” another participant, while their 
study involved a motivation of “self-gain.”  We argue that the framing of severity and related 
consequences across the two paradigms actually differed in the opposite direction. The 
Russano et al. study framed the cheating violation to all participants as a serious case of 
academic dishonesty. In contrast, Levine et al. state that their cheating is not described as 
serious, but rather is minimized by the interviewer: “It was explained that the important thing 
was the integrity of the data, and that was all the interviewer was interested in.” (p. 452). 
Thus, the perceived consequences of confessing (and therein the severity of their behavior) 
was likely quite low for Levine et al.’s participants.    
A second moderator according to Levine et al. was the role of demand characteristics. 
They suggest that Russano et al. were motivated to demonstrate false confessions, and therein 
their study produced such data; in contrast, Levine et al. were motivated to demonstrate 
accuracy, and therein their study produced highly diagnostic outcomes. We agree with Levine 
et al. that their study suffers from the potential for demand characteristics. Study 1 is 
problematic precisely because the interviewer was a member of the research team and not 
blind to the hypotheses or desired outcomes. We know nothing about what the experts in 
Study 2 were informed of when they were “thoroughly briefed on the experimental setting 
and cheating game setup” (p. 451) and we know nothing about the methods they used to elicit 
statements – so we can only speculate about the potential role of demand characteristics in 
these findings. In stark contrast, the Russano et al. study followed best practices in 
behavioural science for reducing the possibility of demand characteristics. All interviewers 
were blind to study manipulations and to the hypotheses of the study. Interviews were 
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completely scripted and interview methods were manipulated across participants. Random 
assignment was used to determine guilt or innocence, as well as exposure to the interrogation 
scripts. In fact, the findings of Russano et al. are significantly less likely to have suffered 
from demand characteristics because these procedures were followed.   
Finally, Levine et al. point to the potential role of interviewer intent. The authors 
suggest that their interviewers were focused on discovering the truth and that they were likely 
more discriminant as a function of this. We agree, in part, with Levine et al. on this point – 
and we do so based squarely upon data from a study employing the Russano et al. paradigm. 
Narchet, Meissner, and Russano (2011) used the cheating paradigm to explore the role of 
interviewer intent on (a) the methods used to elicit a statement, (b) the diagnostic value of 
statements elicited, and (c) how an interviewer's intent influenced their perception of the 
likely guilt/innocence of the subject. 
We pause here to note once again that the Narchet et al. (2011) study followed 
prescribed practices for controlling demand characteristics – experimenters and interviewers 
were blind to the study hypothesis, and to the study’s manipulation of interviewer 
expectancy. Narchet et al. (2011) observed clear evidence for the role of interviewer intent in 
the behavioural confirmation process. When interviewers were led to believe that the subject 
was likely guilty, they used more guilt presumptive methods, elicited more false confessions 
from the innocent, and were biased to believe that participants were more often guilty (not 
innocent), particularly once they had elicited a confession. When interviewers in the Narchet 
et al. (2011) study were led to believe that the participant was likely innocent, interrogations 
still produced false confessions, though they were significantly less frequent when compared 
with investigators who presumed guilt. An analysis of these confessions from the innocent 
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demonstrated that they were the product of methods known to produce false confessions 
(minimization, maximization, and false evidence ploys).  
With respect to the Levine et al. studies, we do not know what tactics were employed 
in Study 2 and whether all participants in Study 1 experienced the same interview protocol. 
An analysis of the methods used by experts in Study 2 could inform us regarding the role of 
certain interview methods in eliciting true confessions, and whether the same or different 
methods were applied when the suspect was determined to be innocent (perhaps as a result of 
the ‘correct question’ tactic) vs. guilty. Nevertheless, interviewer intent (in particular, their 
belief in the guilt or innocence of the suspect) can alter the manner in which an interrogation 
is conducted and is likely to influence the incidence of a false confession.  
Conclusion 
 Levine et al. (2014) claim that experts can accurately distinguish truths from lies 
when they are allowed to actively question a potential liar. We agree that using specific 
interview protocols facilitates lie detection, though we base that conclusion on the extensive 
research in this area rather than on the Levine et al.’s study. The problem with the Levine et 
al.’s paradigm is that it is easy for truth tellers to demonstrate their innocence but virtually 
impossible for liars to tell a convincing lie. When it is obvious to investigators who is telling 
the truth and lying, high accuracy rates will appear and oppressive interview styles that elicit 
false confessions are unlikely to occur. In our view, therefore, the studies reported in this 
article are not only out of step with prior research – they offer no proof of the authors’ claims 
and are dangerously misleading.  
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